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PEFFER V. STEPHENS : PROBABLE CAUSE,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES WITHIN THE
HOME, AND WHY USING TECHNOLOGY




The Fourth Amendment provides for the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Search warrants may only be issued upon a finding of probable
cause. This core tenet of our constitutional republic becomes progressively
flexible with every development in Fourth Amendment interpretation. In Pef-
fer v. Stephens, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deliv-
ered the latest blow to constitutional rights that restrict the State from engaging
in unprincipled searches. In an issue of first impression, the Sixth Circuit held
that a criminal defendant’s alleged use of a computer during the commission
of a crime was adequate probable cause to justify a search of the defendant’s
home and a seizure of the technological equipment inside. Such a shortsighted
justification fails to consider technological innovation, economic policy, and
historical civil liberties. Peffer v. Stephens is the latest proof of the parasitic
relationship between the law and technological advancement. As technology
evolves, the law struggles to keep pace and resultingly impedes economic de-
velopment. With the exponential growth of technology in the 21st century, a
visionary approach to search and seizure law is necessary to promote eco-
nomic innovation and to refrain from further dismantling Fourth Amendment
protections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated . . . .”1 The Fourth Amendment embodies this nation’s
fundamental values of freedom, civil liberty, and personal identity. As
the United States Supreme Court itself has stated, “‘[a]t the very core’
of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intru-
sion.’”2 Thus, the home is especially sacred because of the “occupants’
possessory interests in the premises” and their “privacy interests in the
activities that take place within.”3
The Fourth Amendment was a direct result of what American colo-
nists perceived as violations of their common-law rights. Historically,
“British statutes appeared to give customs officials almost unlimited
authority to search for and seize goods . . . .”4 For example, the Act of
Frauds in the seventeenth century empowered English customs of-
ficers to enter virtually any home and seize prohibited goods by
“break[ing] open doors, chests, trunks, and other package[s].”5
Through court-issued writs of assistance, customs officers essentially
had the authority to conduct warrantless searches at their own discre-
tion.6 These writs effectively authorized customs officers to search and
seize based on nothing more than the officers’ own suspicions.7
Such unfettered governmental power sparked heated resistance
from the citizenry. In 1761, a prominent lawyer from Massachusetts
named James Otis represented a group of Boston citizens and chal-
lenged the writs of assistance.8 In what later become known as “The
Writs of Assistance Case,” Otis argued that the writs were an “instru-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
3. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984).
4. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393, 404 (1995).
5. See Act of Frauds of 1662, 12 Car. 2, c. 11 § V(2) (Eng.), reprinted in 8 DANBY
PICKERING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 78, 81 (London, Bentham 1763).
6. See Act of Frauds of 1696 5 W. & M., c. 22 § VI (Eng.), reprinted in 9 DANBY
PICKERING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE 428, 430 (London, Bentham 1764); see also
Stuntz, supra note 4, at 404–05.
7. See Stuntz, supra note 4, at 405.
8. See Hon. M. Blane Michael, Reading the Fourth Amendment: Guidance from
the Mischief that Gave it Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905, 908 (2010).
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ment of slavery” and “villainy.”9 Ultimately, Otis’s arguments failed
to sway the Massachusetts Superior Court.10 The five-member Supe-
rior Court voted unanimously to continue issuing the challenged
writs.11 However, Otis’s endeavors were not wholly unsuccessful. Fu-
ture United States President John Adams attended the hearings and
was moved by Otis’s arguments.12 Otis’s advocacy in The Writs of As-
sistance Case “galvanized support for what became the Fourth
Amendment.”13 Specifically, Otis helped establish “the principle that
a person’s home is especially private and must be protected from arbi-
trary government intrusion.”14 Further, Otis revealed “the inevitabil-
ity of abuse when government officials have . . . unlimited discretion”
to search and seize.15
The Fourth Amendment has substantially evolved following Otis’s
contributions. With the recent, exponential growth of technology,
Fourth Amendment interpretation has once again become a pressing
issue. Just within the last thirty-five years, there has been a constant
tug-of-war over the application of the Fourth Amendment require-
ment that warrants must be supported by probable cause.16 With each
passing case, the legal requirement for sufficient probable cause be-
comes more flexible. This problem is indicated not only by the in-
creasing number of cases in which courts have permitted unwarranted
searches,17 but also by cases in which courts attempt to justify a search
warrant by using questionable offerings of probable cause.18
Peffer v. Stephens is one of the latest examples of a court attempting
to justify a search warrant by using a controversial finding of probable
cause.19 In an issue of first impression, the United States Court of Ap-
9. Id.
10. Id. at 909.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 908.
14. Id. at 908–09.
15. Id. at 909.
16. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (holding that the controlling
“two-pronged test” for analyzing whether an informant’s tip establishes probable
cause should be abandoned in favor of a “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach).
17. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that officers may search
a person for weapons so long as the officer has reason to believe that he is dealing
with an armed individual, regardless of whether the officer has probable cause to
arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding that officers in hot pur-
suit of a fleeing suspect were reasonable in conducting an unwarranted search of a
house); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (discussing that police may
search a car without first obtaining a warrant because of the inherent mobility of a
car); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588–89 (1980) (discussing that police may
enter and search a home without a warrant if exigent circumstances are present).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 999 F.2d 11, 13 (1993) (holding that there
was adequate probable cause to justify searching a home for marijuana contraband
despite the officer’s affidavit failing to exclude the possibility that the marijuana may
have come from some place other than the defendant’s residence).
19. See generally Peffer v. Stephens, 880 F.3d 256, 259 (6th Cir. 2018).
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peals for the Sixth Circuit held that there was adequate probable
cause to justify a search and seizure within a criminal defendant’s
home simply because he allegedly used a computer during the com-
mission of a crime.20 Such a shortsighted justification completely ig-
nores the sanctity of the home and erodes Fourth Amendment
protections. The holding also fails to consider civil liberties, economic
policy, and the exponential rate of technological innovation. Such
cases are a significant root of market distortions and negative eco-
nomic incentives.21 Put simply, the holding in Peffer is another link in
the chain of cases that have trampled on individual rights for the sake
of State power.
This Comment argues why the approach in Peffer is erroneous. Part
II begins this Comment by explaining the legal standard for Fourth
Amendment claims that relate to the facts of Peffer. Part III provides
a factual background of the Peffer case and objectively explains the
Peffer rationale. Part IV analyzes the Peffer decision by discussing the
legal sufficiency of probable cause and the breadth of the Peffer hold-
ing. This Section also includes a discussion on the technological, eco-
nomic, and public policy implications of the Peffer decision. Finally,
Part V concludes this Comment with a discussion of how the Peffer
holding may be applied in the future. Further, this Section recom-
mends how search and seizure law should move forward.
II. STANDARD FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.22
The Fourth Amendment governs searches and seizures that are a
product of government action.23 Fourth Amendment protections are
“wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure . . . effected by a private
individual not acting as an agent of the [g]overnment.’”24 The Fourth
Amendment is comprised of two separate clauses: (1) a prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and (2) a requirement
that all warrants be supported by probable cause.25
20. See id. at 273.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
23. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
24. See id. (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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A. What is a Search?
A search is a governmental intrusion wherever an individual
harbors a reasonable expectation of privacy.26 The Supreme Court of
the United States has adopted a two-part test to determine whether an
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy.27 The first inquiry is
“whether the individual, by his conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual (sub-
jective) expectation of privacy’” in the place or things to be
searched.28 Second, the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy
must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”29
In other words, the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy must
also be objectively justifiable under the circumstances.30 Some factors
that courts around the United States have considered when determin-
ing whether a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy
include:
(1) Legitimate presence in the area searched;31
(2) Prior use of the area searched;32
(3) Ability to control or exclude others’ use of the property;33
(4) Proprietary or possessory interest in the place to be
searched;34
(5) Whether the defendant has taken normal precautions to main-
tain his or her privacy;35
(6) Whether the place or object searched was put to private use;36
and
(7) Whether the claim of privacy is consistent with the historical
notion of privacy.37
“The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”38 The in-
quiry of whether a search has occurred generally hinges on whether
the individual has a valid expectation of privacy, not whether the place
to be searched is constitutionally protected.39 For example, “what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
26. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
27. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
28. See id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
29. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
30. Id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
31. United States v. Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 965 (1st Cir. 1982).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. United States v. King, 227 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir. 2000).
35. Id.
36. State v. Granville, 423 S.W.3d 399, 408 (Tex. 2014).
37. Id.
38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967)).
39. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (explaining that the problem presented is not
whether the area in question is constitutionally protected).
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fice, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”40 However,
what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”41
Courts consider the intrusiveness of an action when determining
whether government activity constitutes a search.42 For example, the
use of a drug-sniffing dog at an airport is considered a minimally inva-
sive intrusion and thus generally does not constitute a search under
the Fourth Amendment.43 By contrast, blood-testing procedures are
intrusions into the human body and are thus considered searches
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.44 Because of the intru-
siveness of a blood draw, whenever officers can reasonably obtain a
warrant before drawing blood “without significantly undermining the
efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do
so.”45
Another factor that courts consider is the sophistication of the tech-
nology that the government uses when effectuating a search.46 For ex-
ample, the use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain “information
regarding the interior of [a] home . . . constitutes a search—at least
where . . . the technology in question is not in general public use.”47 In
Kyllo v. United States, the government used thermal-imaging technol-
ogy to detect the heat radiating from a house in order to charge a
defendant with manufacturing marijuana.48 The Supreme Court held
that the use of this technology constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment partly because such technology was not generally availa-
ble for public use.49 By contrast, the Supreme Court has held that ae-
rial observation does not constitute a search because the public is
“free to inspect the [area] from the vantage point of an aircraft.”50
Kyllo reinforced the principle that there is no Fourth Amendment
search if officers gain information by observing things that are in pub-
lic view.51 Kyllo reiterated the Court’s holding in California v. Ciraolo
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment protection of the home has never been
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that the use
of a drug-sniffing dog was not considered a search partly because the use of the dog
was minimally invasive).
43. See id.
44. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
45. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 152 (2013).
46. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (explaining that the use
of sense-enhancing technology constitutes a search when the technology in question is
not generally available for public use).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 30.
49. See id. at 34.
50. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE &
PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 303 (6th ed. 2018).
51. See generally Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
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extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”52
A search also occurs when “‘the [g]overnment obtains information
by physically intruding’ on” an individual’s property.53 Though prop-
erty rights are not typically the first consideration in a Fourth Amend-
ment analysis, the Fourth Amendment still precludes the government
from physically intruding into a constitutionally protected area for the
purpose of obtaining information.54 Thus, agents of the State may not
“stand in a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with
impunity.”55
The areas “immediately surrounding and associated with the home”
are considered “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses.”56 For example, the use of a drug-sniffing dog at the front
porch of someone’s home constitutes a search.57 The American legal
concept of privacy evolved such that “[o]ur law holds the property of
every man so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s
close without his leave.”58 Thus, the State generally may not trespass
onto an individual’s property and use a “trained police dog to explore
the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evi-
dence.”59 Such a trespass constitutes a search without conducting the
“reasonable expectation of privacy” test.60 Similarly, installing a GPS
device on a vehicle constitutes a search because such activity is a phys-
ical occupation of private property for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation.61 Put simply, a search occurs either when the government
intrudes on a reasonable expectation of privacy62 or when the govern-
ment trespasses onto private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.63
B. What is a Seizure of Property?
A property seizure generally occurs “when there is some meaning-
ful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that prop-
erty.”64 Seizures, just like searches, only occur when conducted by a
52. Id. (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
53. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (citing United States v. Jones, 565
U.S. 400, 406–07 (2012)).
54. See id.; see also United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
55. Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6.
56. Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
57. See, e.g., Jardines, 569 U.S. at 11–12.
58. Id. at 8 (quoting Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807).
59. See id. at 9.
60. See id. at 11.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012).
62. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
63. See Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013).
64. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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government actor.65 The Fourth Amendment’s protection against un-
reasonable seizures does not apply to seizures, even unreasonable
ones, “effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the
Government or with the participation or knowledge of any govern-
mental official.”66 Further, property seizures are “subject to Fourth
Amendment scrutiny even [if] no search within the meaning of the
[Fourth] Amendment has taken place.”67
Generally, governmental “assertion of dominion and control” over
an individual’s tangible property is considered a seizure.68 For exam-
ple, in United States v. Jacobsen, federal agents removed four plastic
bags from a damaged package at a private freight carrier.69 The agents
opened each of the four bags and removed traces of a white sub-
stance.70 The substance was identified as cocaine and arrests were sub-
sequently made for possession of an illegal substance with intent to
distribute.71 The Court in Jacobsen held that “the agents’ assertion of
dominion and control over the package and its contents [constituted]
a ‘seizure.’”72
Not all governmental interferences with property constitute
seizures. Interference does not constitute a seizure when the govern-
mental involvement with the property is insignificant or amounts to
merely a “technical trespass.”73 For example, in United States v. Karo,
the government installed a “beeper” on a container of ether in order
to monitor its location.74 The Court in Karo held that the installation
of the beeper did not constitute a seizure because it could not “be said
that anyone’s possessory interest was interfered with in a meaningful
way.”75 The Court found that “[a]t most, there was a technical tres-
pass on the space occupied by the beeper.”76 Similarly, in Arizona v.
Hicks, an officer read and recorded the serial numbers of two sets of
stolen stereo components.77 The Court held that the recording of the
serial numbers did not constitute a seizure because it “did not ‘mean-
ingfully interfere’ with [the individual’s] possessory interest in either
the serial numbers or the equipment.”78
65. See id.
66. Id. (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980)).
67. Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 68 (1992).
68. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120.
69. See id. at 111.
70. See id. at 111–12.
71. See id. at 112.
72. Id. at 120.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (holding that govern-
mental interference with a container did not constitute a seizure partly because the
action was a “technical trespass” and did not interfere with possessory interests in a
“meaningful way”).
74. See id. at 708.
75. Id. at 712.
76. Id.
77. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987).
78. Id. at 324; see also Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).
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Seizures generally do not occur unless there is interference with a
possessory interest in the property involved.79 This component of a
seizure becomes important in situations when individuals forfeit their
possessory interests in an item of property by voluntary abandonment
or transfer. For example, the Court in Maryland v. Macon held that
the purchase of magazines by a county detective did not constitute a
seizure because the sales clerk “voluntarily transferred any possessory
interest he may have had in the magazines to the purchaser upon the
receipt of the funds.”80
Although Fourth Amendment seizures generally involve an inter-
ference with a person’s possessory interests in tangible property, the
Supreme Court has held that even a defendant’s words, in the form of
recorded oral statements, can be the subject of a seizure.81 In these
types of cases, the analysis of whether a seizure has occurred becomes
similar to the search analysis. For example, the Court in Katz v. United
States determined that the government seized a defendant’s phone
conversation when it intruded upon a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy by recording the defendant’s words electronically.82 Put simply, a
seizure occurs either “when there is some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interests in [tangible] property,”83 or in
special circumstances where the government seizes abstracts by in-
truding upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.84
C. What Makes a Search Within the Home Unreasonable?
The Fourth Amendment only prohibits unreasonable searches, not
reasonable ones.85 Further, “warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable.”86 Thus, a search is “ordinarily unreasonable in the ab-
sence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.”87 Case by case, the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement has become subject to nu-
merous exceptions.88 Warrantless searches have become reasonable so
79. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
80. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985).
81. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
82. See id.
83. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113.
84. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (holding that the government seized a defen-
dant’s phone conversation when it intruded upon a reasonable expectation of privacy
by recording the defendant’s words electronically).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
86. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 141.
87. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000).
88. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (holding that officers may search a per-
son for weapons so long as the officer “has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether [the officer] has probable
cause to arrest”); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding that officers in
hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect were reasonable in conducting an unwarranted search
of a house); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (discussing that police may
search a car without first obtaining a warrant because of the inherent mobility of a
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long as they fall within any one of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement.89
The United States Supreme Court has held that “the Fourth
Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’”90 The
home is sacred under the Fourth Amendment because “‘[a]t the very
core’ of the Fourth Amendment ‘stands the right of a man to retreat
into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.’”91 Thus, an even “greater burden is placed on [govern-
ment] officials who enter a home or dwelling without consent.”92 The
Court has held that “the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’”93
But despite the sanctity of the home, there are still many exceptions to
the warrant requirement when the government conducts a search
within an individual’s household.94
One of the most recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
applies “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.”95 To determine whether exi-
gent circumstances exist, courts apply a finely tuned “totality of the
circumstances” test.96 There are many examples of circumstances that
“may give rise to an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless
search.”97 Some examples include:
(1) “Law enforcement’s need to provide emergency assistance to
an occupant of a home”;98
(2) When law enforcement is in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing
suspect;99
car); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588–89 (1980) (discussing that police may
enter and search a home without a warrant if exigent circumstances are present).
89. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013).
90. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at
590).
91. See id. at 31. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
92. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 587 (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,
389 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
93. Id. at 585–86 (quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972)).
94. See, e.g., id. at 588–89 (discussing that police may enter and search a home
without a warrant if exigent circumstances are present); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298 (1967) (holding that officers in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect were reasona-
ble in conducting an unwarranted search of a house).
95. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148–49 (2013) (quoting Kentucky v. King,
563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)).
96. Id. at 149.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., id. (citing Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2009) (per curiam)).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976).
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(3) Law enforcement “enter[ing] a burning building to put out a
fire and investigate its cause”;100 and
(4) To “prevent the imminent destruction of evidence.”101
Ultimately, each case of alleged exigency is evaluated “based ‘on its
own facts and circumstances.’”102 But in the absence of exigent cir-
cumstances, a warrantless entry to search is generally considered un-
reasonable and is thus unconstitutional.103
Another exception to the warrant requirement exists when an of-
ficer performs a search incident to arrest.104 The Fourth Amendment
permits an officer to arrest an individual for “even a very minor crimi-
nal offense,” so long as the officer “has probable cause to believe that
[the] individual has committed” the offense in the officer’s pres-
ence.105 Further, a search may be permissible even if its justification
includes a reasonable mistake of fact or law.106 At the time of arrest,
officers may lawfully search the arrestee and the area within the arres-
tee’s control.107 Generally, officers must have an arrest warrant to ef-
fectuate a nonemergency arrest of an individual inside his or her own
home.108 However, whenever officers are lawfully conducting an ar-
rest inside an individual’s home, the officers may lawfully search the
area within the individual’s control.109
Officers may also conduct a search when an individual gives con-
sent.110 The Supreme Court has held that “[e]ven when law enforce-
ment officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they
may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to
search . . . provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive
means.”111
Consent must be voluntary.112 Voluntariness is determined by ex-
amining the totality of the circumstances.113 When examining the sur-
rounding circumstances, “account must be taken of subtly coercive
100. See, e.g., McNeely, 569 U.S. at 149 (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499,
509–10 (1978)).
101. See id. at 149 (citing Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973)).
102. Id. at 150 (quoting Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931)).
103. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587–88 (1980).
104. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
105. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).
106. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57–60 (2014).
107. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224–25.
108. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 585, 588–89; see also Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
753 (1984) (holding that a warrantless arrest inside an individual’s home for a minor
offense violated the Fourth Amendment).
109. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224.
110. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (explaining that
the Fourth Amendment permits officers to request consent to search).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 207.
113. See id.
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police questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of
the person who consents.”114 Officers are not required to “inform citi-
zens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a
warrantless consent search.”115
Under some circumstances, such as when officers are dealing with
co-tenants of a residence, a third party may give consent on behalf of
another individual if officers reasonably believe that the third party
has apparent authority to give consent.116 However, if one tenant con-
sents but another objects to being searched, there must be either exi-
gent circumstances or a search warrant in order for officers to enter
the property.117 Ultimately, valid-consent searches are one of the
many exceptions to the warrant requirement under the Fourth
Amendment.118 Warrantless searches—especially those within the
home—must fall within one of these recognized exceptions in order to
be considered reasonable.119
D. What Makes a Seizure of Property Unreasonable?
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures.120 Gener-
ally, there must be “a nexus . . . between the item to be seized and
[the] criminal behavior” in question.121 Similar to searches, “a seizure
of personal property [is] per se unreasonable within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judi-
cial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing
the items to be seized.”122 The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that
property seizures must generally be supported by a warrant has also
become subject to numerous exceptions.123
Perhaps the most recognized exception to the warrant requirement
as it applies to property seizures is known as the “plain view” doc-
trine.124 Under this doctrine, “objects falling in the plain view of an
officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be introduced in evidence.”125 This doc-
114. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 229 (1973).
115. See Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206.
116. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
117. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 114–15 (2006).
118. See, e.g., Drayton, 536 U.S. at 201 (explaining that the Fourth Amendment
permits officers to request consent to search).
119. See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013); see also Payton, 445 U.S.
573, 587 (1980) (explaining that a “greater burden” is placed on government officials
who seek to enter a home).
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
121. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967).
122. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983).
123. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–65 (1971) (discussing
the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement).
124. Id.
125. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
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trine applies even when officers are inside a home.126 For example, if
officers have a warrant to search a specific area—such as a house-
hold—for certain objects, and “in the course of the search come across
some other article[s] of incriminating character,” the officers may law-
fully seize those articles.127
“Plain view” seizures are also permissible when the officers’ initial
intrusion is supported by one of the other recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement.128 Thus, officers may seize items in “plain
view” when the officers’ initial intrusion is based on a finding of exi-
gent circumstances.129 For example, officers may unintentionally dis-
cover incriminating evidence in “plain view” during scenarios
involving hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect130 or a search incident to
arrest.131 However, “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to ex-
tend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges.”132 “Plain view” seizures are
“legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that
they have evidence before them . . . .”133
Another exception to the warrant requirement as it applies to prop-
erty seizures exists when an individual has no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the items being seized.134 For example, in Jacobsen, the
Supreme Court held that a package at a private freight carrier could
“no longer support any expectation of privacy.”135 Thus, the Court
held that the package “may be seized, at least temporarily, without a
warrant.”136 However, it is rarely a challenging issue to determine
whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in activ-
ity that happens inside the individual’s home, at least where such ac-
tivity is not in “plain view.” The home is considered sacred.137 As
explained by the Court in Kyllo, there is always at least some “mini-
mal expectation of privacy that exists” in cases regarding searches
126. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990) (explaining that the “plain
view” doctrine is applicable to “situation[s] in which the police have a warrant to
search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across
some other article of incriminating character”) (citations omitted).
127. See id. (citations omitted).
128. See id. (citations omitted).
129. See id. at 135–36 (citations omitted).
130. See id. at 135 (explaining that “police may inadvertently come across evidence
while in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect”) (citations omitted).
131. See id. (explaining that “an object that comes into view during a search inci-
dent to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized
without a warrant”) (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
133. Id. (citations omitted).
134. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 121–22 (1984).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 121.
137. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (explaining that the “physi-
cal entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed”) (citation omitted).
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within the interior of a home.138 Thus, it is hard to imagine a lawful,
warrantless seizure of items inside a home based on a finding that the
homeowner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in those items.
Ultimately, warrantless seizures—especially those within the home—
must fall within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement in order to be considered reasonable.139
E. Probable Cause
“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”140 Search warrants
“may be issued to search any property, whether or not occupied by a
third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits, in-
strumentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found.”141 However,
there must be “‘reasonable cause to believe that the specific [evi-
dence] to be searched for and seized are located on the property’ . . .
not merely ‘that the owner of property is suspected of a crime.’”142
The Supreme Court has held that “[p]robable cause exists when there
is a ‘fair probability,’ given the totality of the circumstances, that con-
traband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”143
Inferences of probable cause must be “drawn by ‘a neutral and de-
tached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’”144 Magis-
trates issuing search warrants must meet two requirements: (1) they
must be “neutral and detached,” and (2) they “must be capable of
determining whether probable cause exists” for the requested
search.145 A magistrate may infer where evidence is likely to be found
based on “the nature of the crime and type of offense.”146 However, in
order to make a determination of probable cause, “the issuing judge
must undertake a ‘practical, common sense’ evaluation of ‘all of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him.’”147
138. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
139. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (explaining that warrant-
less seizures are per se unreasonable unless supported by a warrant); see also Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–65 (1971) (discussing an example of an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement).
140. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
141. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978).
142. See United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556).
143. United States v. Loggins, 777 F.2d 336, 338 (6th Cir. 1985).
144. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
145. Id.
146. United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1192 (6th Cir. 1996)).
147. Id. (quoting United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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An officer’s affidavit presented in support of probable cause must
contain “particularized facts demonstrating ‘a fair probability that evi-
dence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed
search.’”148 The belief that the evidence will be found at the place to
be searched requires “more than mere suspicion.”149 In other words, a
hunch does not equate to probable cause.150 Furthermore, simple
“good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.”151 As
explained by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, “[i]f subjective
good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment would evaporate, and the people would be ‘secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects,’ only in the discretion of the
police.”152
The purpose of the neutral and detached magistrate requirement is
to create an “assurance that a search and arrest will not proceed with-
out probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the person or place named in the warrant is involved in the
crime.”153 Accordingly, “[t]he critical element in a reasonable search
is not that the owner of the property is suspected of [a] crime but that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be
searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is
sought.”154 In other words, there must be a sufficient “nexus between
the evidence sought and the place to be searched.”155
Whether an officer’s affidavit establishes a proper nexus between
the evidence sought and the place to be searched is “a fact-intensive
question resolved by examining the totality of the circumstances
presented.”156 Magistrates may “infer a nexus between a suspect and
his residence, depending upon ‘the type of crime being investigated,
the nature of things to be seized, the extent of an opportunity to con-
ceal the evidence elsewhere and the normal inferences that may be
148. United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2005)).
149. Williams, 544 F.3d at 686 (quoting United States v. Bethal, 245 F. App’x 460,
464 (2007)) (citation omitted).
150. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (explaining that the Court refuses to
sanction “intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches”).
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
153. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
154. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978).
155. See United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 382 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Greene
v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “the probable cause
requirement . . . is satisfied if the facts and circumstances are such that a reasonably
prudent person would be warranted in believing that an offense had been committed
and that evidence thereof would be found on the premises to be searched”).
156. Brown, 828 F.3d at 382.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\7-3\TWL301.txt unknown Seq: 16  3-APR-20 10:29
662 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7
drawn as to likely hiding places.’”157 But ultimately, probable cause
must be supported by more than just a hunch.158
III. PEFFER V. STEPHENS
A. Background
In June of 2011, Jesse Peffer served as a “caregiver for several medi-
cal-marijuana patients, for whom he grew marijuana sufficient to
cover their medical-marijuana needs.”159 When Peffer’s cannabis
plants produced more marijuana than he needed, Peffer sold the sur-
plus to Tom Beemer, who owned a medical-marijuana dispensary.160
Peffer was unaware that Beemer was working for law enforcement as
a confidential informant for both the Central Michigan Enforcement
Team (“CMET”) and the Traverse Narcotics Team (“TNT”).161
Beemer asked Peffer to sell him more marijuana than was permit-
ted under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act.162 Growing suspi-
cious of Beemer’s request, Peffer agreed to meet with him.163 As
Peffer drove to the meeting, he was stopped by Officers Coon, King,
and Edinger.164 During the stop, the officers found more marijuana in
Peffer’s car than he was allowed to possess under state law.165 Accord-
ingly, the officers arrested Peffer and charged him with possession
with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute marijuana.166
Eight months later, the local school district and child services
agency received typewritten letters purporting to be written by Officer
Coon.167 The letters accused Beemer of distributing controlled sub-
stances and becoming a confidential informant “in exchange for im-
munity [and] leniency in sentencing.”168 Officer Coon denied creating
the letters.169 Police identified five potential suspects who may have
authored the letters, two of whom were Jesse Peffer and his wife.170
Over a year later, an investigating officer named Trooper Glentz
received two packages in the mail, each containing marijuana seeds.171
157. United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1985)).
158. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (explaining that the Court refuses to
sanction “intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches”).











170. Id. at 261.
171. Id.
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The packages had been returned to Trooper Glentz’s house due to
insufficient postage.172 Trooper Glentz denied sending the pack-
ages.173 Further, a sergeant named Mike Stephens was informed that
two different types of fliers were being mailed to local businesses and
residences identifying Beemer as a confidential informant.174 One
type of the fliers displayed a picture of Beemer, listed the charges
against him, and requested that the public contact law enforcement
should they have any information.175 The other type of flier had the
same picture and list of charges but also contained a political attack
aimed at the local prosecutor who was believed to be part of Beemer’s
cases.176 Investigators concluded that Peffer was most likely the per-
son responsible for the fliers.177
Believing Peffer was responsible for sending the fliers, Sergeant
Stephens obtained a warrant to search the Peffer residence.178 Ser-
geant Stephens’s affidavit in support of the search warrant “provided
details as to the letters that had been sent, the suspected marijuana
seeds, the fliers, and the potential connections between Mr. Peffer and
the mailings.”179 As the Sixth Circuit explained, the warrant “author-
ized the following personal property to be searched for at the house
and, if found, to be searched and seized:
(1) ‘records, files, or documents pertaining to Thomas Owen
Beemer and his role as a confidential informant and/or dismissal of
charges in’ certain courts, with ‘documents’ described as including
‘records or documents which were created, modified . . . or inter-
preted by a computer’ and more specifically identified to include
certain computer hardware, computer-related equipment, periph-
eral and storage devices, software and other items used for com-
puter operation, communication, encryption, and access, as well as
electronic mail (“e-mail”) and other electronically stored communi-
cations or messages; and
(2) ‘[a]ny and all mailing items including but not limited to en-
velopes, address labels, and stamps that match the items seized in
this investigation.’”180
The magistrate found that probable cause existed for the searches
and seizures based on Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit in which he as-
serted that the house “may contain evidence of the crime of Imper-









180. Id. at 261–62.
181. Id. at 262.
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Stephens and five other officers executed the warrant at the Peffer
residence on the same day it was issued.182 The officers seized “a
laptop, two computer towers, two printers, a digital video recorder, an
audio recorder, and a number of envelopes, stamps, and papers.”183
Following further investigation into the matter, “prosecutors declined
to pursue any criminal charges against the Peffers.”184
As a result, the Peffers brought a civil suit against Sergeant Ste-
phens and other defendants, alleging a deprivation of rights stemming
from Mr. Peffer’s traffic stop and the search of the Peffer residence.185
As part of the suit, “the Peffers alleged that Sergeant Stephens’s affi-
davit lacked facts sufficient to support the magistrate’s finding that
there was probable cause to search” their residence “because the affi-
davit failed to establish that a crime had been committed or that a
nexus existed between the alleged crimes and the house, in part be-
cause it failed to establish probable cause to believe that Mr. Peffer
had committed the alleged crimes.”186 Additionally, the Peffers al-
leged that “Sergeant Stephens’s reliance on the warrant was unreason-
able, [thus] rendering qualified immunity inapplicable.”187
Rejecting the Peffers’ arguments, the district court granted Sergeant
Stephens’s motion for summary judgment.188 Accordingly, the Peffers
appealed to the Sixth Circuit.189 The Sixth Circuit was then tasked
with determining “the extent of the Fourth Amendment’s require-
ments for an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the residence of
an individual suspected of committing a crime involving the use of a
computer.”190
B. Holding and Reasoning
In a unanimous decision written by Judge John Bush, the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling that Sergeant Stephens executed
a valid warrant supported by probable cause.191 The court began by
acknowledging the presumption that a warrant was required before
searching the Peffer residence.192
The court then moved into its analysis of whether the warrant was
adequately supported by probable cause.193 As the court explained,









190. Id. at 259.
191. Id. at 259, 273–74.
192. Id. at 262.
193. Id. at 263.
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reasonably prudent person would be warranted in believing that an
offense had been committed and that evidence thereof would be
found on the premises to be searched.’”194 Further, the court asserted
that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require probable cause to
believe evidence will conclusively establish a fact before permitting a
search . . . .”195 Instead, as the court explained, the Fourth Amend-
ment simply requires that there be “probable cause . . . to believe that
the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or
conviction.”196
The Peffers argued that Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit did not estab-
lish probable cause for two main reasons.197 First, the Peffers argued
that the affidavit did not provide reason to believe “that a crime had
been committed.”198 Second, the Peffers argued that the affidavit did
not establish “that evidence of the alleged crime would be found at
[their] residence.”199
The Sixth Circuit’s opinion resolved these two arguments sepa-
rately. First, the court opted not to address whether there was a
Fourth Amendment violation regarding the affidavit failing to “prop-
erly allege that a crime had been committed.”200 Instead, the court
concluded “that there was no clearly established constitutional viola-
tion,” thus Sergeant Stephens was protected by qualified immunity.201
As the court explained, “it was not clearly established that Mr. Pef-
fer’s actions as alleged in the affidavit did not violate” Michigan state
law.202
Essentially, the crime that Mr. Peffer was charged with was “unset-
tled state law.”203 The court concluded that it was “an open question
of Michigan law whether a private citizen writing under the guise of a
police officer to request an official to perform an official action consti-
tutes an attempt to ‘compel’ action under” the Michigan Penal
Code.204 As a result, the court held that even if Mr. Peffer’s actions
were not criminal under the Michigan Penal Code, “the law on this
point was not clearly established.”205 Thus, Sergeant Stephens was
“protected by qualified immunity from liability . . . .”206
Next, the court addressed the Peffers’ argument that “the warrant
was constitutionally defective because the affidavit failed to present
194. Id. (quoting Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996)).
195. Id. (quoting Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 552 n.7 (2012)).
196. Id. (quoting Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 552 n.7).




201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 265.
203. Id. at 264.
204. Id. at 266.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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facts sufficient to establish that ‘evidence thereof would be found on
the premises to be searched.’”207 The Peffers argued that “[b]ecause
the affidavit allege[d] Mr. Peffer as the only link between the mailings
and the [Peffer] residence, if there was no probable cause to believe
that he originated the mailings, there would be no probable cause to
believe that evidence of the mailings would be found at the [Peffer]
residence.”208 The Peffers raised multiple points in support of this ar-
gument, a few of which the court decided to discuss.209
First, the affidavit stated, “Det. Coon informed D/Sgt. Lator that he
suspected Jesse Lee Peffer . . . as being the author and sender of the
letters based on his CMET experience and contacts.”210 The Peffers
argued that this portion of the affidavit “was nothing more than the
‘unsupported conclusion[] of [Detective] Coon’ and that ‘no facts . . .
were attested to so that the magistrate could draw his own conclu-
sion.’”211 The court acknowledged that “Detective Coon’s suspicion,
unsupported by an articulation of its basis, [was] insufficient to sup-
port a finding of probable cause . . . .”212 However, the court held that
the affidavit, taken as a whole, “clearly support[ed] the magistrate’s
finding of probable cause to believe that the mailings originated with
Mr. Peffer.”213 Specifically, Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit contended
that:
(1) Beemer had provided information that led to Mr. Peffer’s
arrest;
(2) The letters naming Beemer had been sent after Mr. Peffer’s
arrest;
(3) The fliers, which specifically named a prosecutor who had
been present at Mr. Peffer’s sentencing, had been sent within
two weeks of said sentencing;
(4) Trooper Glentz received the marijuana seeds while he was try-
ing to contact Mr. Peffer;
(5) Mr. Peffer was the only person on whom Beemer had in-
formed whom Trooper Glentz had attempted to contact;
(6) The fliers asked for any information regarding Beemer to be
forwarded to CMET and TNT, and Mr. Peffer was the only
individual in the counties targeted by the mailings who had
been charged with crimes stemming from interactions with
both CMET and TNT; and
(7) The mailings had been postmarked from Grand Rapids, which
is the central sorting facility for the area where the [Peffers’]
residence is located.214





212. Id. at 266–67.
213. Id. at 267.
214. Id.
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Based on these contentions, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “no rea-
sonable jury could fail to find that Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit pro-
vided ‘adequate supporting facts about the underlying circumstances
to show that probable cause exist[ed]’ to connect Mr. Peffer to the
mailings.”215 The Sixth Circuit also rejected the Peffers’ argument that
Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit contained materially false statements.216
Next, the court analyzed the nexus between the mailings and the
Peffers’ residence.217 The Peffers began by arguing that Sergeant Ste-
phens’s affidavit lacked sufficient facts to support a belief that evi-
dence of the mailings would be found at the home.218 The Peffers
pointed to the fact that in the affidavit, “no assertion was made that
Mr. Peffer owned either a computer or a printer or, if he did, that he
kept those items at [his] residence.”219
In response,
Sergeant Stephens argue[d] that the magistrate was reasonable in
finding a connection between the [Peffer] residence and the items to
be sought because the affidavit reported that the letters and fliers
appeared to be computer-generated . . . [and] evidence of those doc-
uments was likely to be found on an electronic storage device,
which . . . would likely be kept at its owner’s residence.220
As the court explained, it was a question of first impression
“whether the nature of a computer is such that its use in a crime is
alone sufficient to justify an inference that, because of ‘the nature of
the things to be seized,’ evidence of the crime is likely to be found in
the alleged criminal’s residence.”221 According to the court, “this
question is not a difficult one to answer based on basic principles.”222
The court began its analysis by arguing that “it is reasonable . . . to
assume that a person keeps his possessions where he resides.”223 Fur-
ther, “[i]f an affidavit presents probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed by means of an object, . . . a magistrate may pre-
sume that there is a nexus between that object and the suspect’s cur-
rent residence, unless the affidavit contains facts that may rebut that
presumption.”224 The Sixth Circuit admitted that it had never before
“articulated this presumption in precisely this manner.”225 Nonethe-
less, the Sixth Circuit chose to adopt this presumption after analyzing
215. Id. (quoting United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1377 (6th Cir. 1996)).
216. See id. at 268.




221. Id. at 270.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 270–71.
225. Id. at 271.
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some of its previous cases involving “the connection between the ob-
jects used in a crime and the alleged criminal’s residence.”226
First, the court created an analogy between cases involving the use
of a computer and cases involving the use of a firearm.227 Regarding
firearms, the Sixth Circuit has “acknowledged that individuals who
own guns keep them at their homes.”228 Thus, “a suspect’s use of a
gun in the commission of a crime is sufficient to find a nexus between
the gun that was used and the suspect’s residence.”229 The court ad-
mitted, however, that “[c]omputers are dissimilar to guns in many
ways . . . .”230 Nonetheless, the court asserted that guns and computers
“are both personal possessions often kept in their owner’s residence
and therefore subject to the presumption that a nexus exists between
an object used in a crime and the suspect’s current residence.”231
Next, the court pointed to three child pornography cases where
search warrants were supposedly issued based “on affidavits with
scant evidence supporting a nexus beyond the use of a computer.”232
The first case found that an “affidavit established nexus because [it
alleged that] the suspect’s residence had high-speed internet and the
suspect had been observed using a laptop on his front porch.”233 The
second case found that an affidavit established nexus because it al-
leged that “the IP address used to distribute prohibited material was
accessed by a residential modem located in the general vicinity of the
suspect’s residence . . . .”234 Finally, the third case found that an affida-
vit established a nexus because it “established that the suspect had a
computer at his residence and had sent an email containing prohibited
material . . . .”235
The court then attempted to draw a distinction between cases in-
volving the use of a computer and cases involving drug distribution.236
This is because in cases involving drug distribution, the Sixth Circuit
had previously held that “if the affidavit fails to include facts that di-
rectly connect the residence with the suspected drug dealing activity,
or the evidence of this connection is unreliable, it cannot be inferred
that drugs will be found in the defendant’s home—even if the defen-
dant is a known drug dealer.”237 The court reasoned that, “unlike guns
and computers that are used in the commission of a crime, when drugs
226. Id.
227. Id. at 272.
228. Id. at 271 (quoting United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 473, 480 (6th Cir. 1999)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 272.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing United States v. Elbe, 774 F.3d 885, 889–90 (6th Cir. 2014)).
234. Id. (citing United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2009)).
235. Id. (citing United States v. Terry, 522 F.3d 645, 648 (6th Cir. 2008)).
236. Id. at 272–73.
237. United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 384 (6th Cir. 2016).
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are used in the commission of a distribution offense, the distributed
drugs are no longer in the possession of the suspected distributor.”238
Under the court’s view, “guns and computers are objects that gener-
ally remain in the suspect’s possession after commission of the crime,
and therefore it is reasonable to believe those possessions to be stored
at the suspect’s residence, absent evidence to the contrary.”239
Accordingly, in Peffer, the court held that Sergeant Stephens’s “affi-
davit included allegations that Mr. Peffer had used a computer in the
commission of his crime, [and] that evidence of the crime would likely
be found on that computer, . . . thereby establishing a presumption
that evidence of the crime would be found at [his] residence.”240 Ac-
cording to the court, the fact that “the affidavit did not allege that Mr.
Peffer owned a computer or that he kept one at [his] residence is im-
material, because the averment that he used one in the commission of
a crime is sufficient to create the presumption that it would be found
at his residence.”241 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that “Sergeant Ste-
phens executed a valid warrant supported by probable cause,” and
there was no Fourth Amendment violation when officers searched the
Peffer residence.242
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PEFFER RATIONALE
A. Was the Affidavit Supported by Legally Sufficient
Probable Cause?
In Peffer, neither side disputed that a warrant was necessary before
searching the Peffer residence and seizing items inside.243 The facts in
Peffer would not fall under any of the well-recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement.244 Consequently, the initial question is
whether the search warrant was supported by legally sufficient proba-
ble cause. In this issue of first impression, the Sixth Circuit held that
Mr. Peffer’s alleged use of a computer during the commission of a
crime was adequate probable cause to justify a search of his home and
a seizure of the technological equipment inside.245 The Sixth Circuit’s
holding in this case was simply the latest blow to constitutional rights
that restrict the State from engaging in unprincipled searches.
The first issue with the court’s reasoning in Peffer is that the major-
ity treated the Peffers’ two probable cause arguments separately. The
Peffers first argued that Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit failed to prop-





243. Id. at 262.
244. See supra Part II.
245. Peffer, 880 F.3d at 256, 270.
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erly allege that a crime had been committed.246 Secondly, the Peffers
argued that the affidavit did not establish that evidence of the alleged
crime would be found at their residence.247 In the Sixth Circuit’s own
words, “the court should consider whether the totality of the circum-
stances supports a finding of probable cause . . . .”248 However, instead
of treating the Peffers’ arguments as a totality, the court opted to ana-
lyze them one by one. First, on qualified-immunity grounds, the court
decided not to address whether there was a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion regarding the affidavit failing to “properly allege that a crime had
been committed.”249 In a completely separate analysis, the court held
that there was a proper nexus between the alleged crime and the Pef-
fer residence to support a finding of probable cause.250
Treating these arguments separately is faulty. The overall question
is whether evidence of a crime is likely to be found in the place to be
searched.251 If it is not clear that the alleged conduct is a crime, then
that fact would certainly discount the odds that there would be evi-
dence of a crime in the place to be searched. Treating the two argu-
ments separately, rather than as a totality, leads to a tenuous finding
of probable cause. If the court had treated the circumstances in Peffer
as a totality, as Sixth Circuit precedent mandates, perhaps a different
conclusion would have been reached. The Sixth Circuit should have
undertaken “a ‘practical, common sense’ evaluation of ‘all of the cir-
cumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . .’”252
Next, the court incorrectly shifted the burden when analyzing
whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation regarding Sergeant
Stephens’s affidavit failing to properly allege that a crime had been
committed. Probable cause requires a finding that “a reasonably pru-
dent person would be warranted in believing that an offense had been
committed . . . .”253 Thus, it follows that the officer preparing the affi-
davit in support of probable cause has the burden of producing ar-
ticulable facts that suggest that a crime has been committed. The Sixth
Circuit, however, completely ignored this burden.
Instead of requiring Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit to produce
enough facts to show that a crime had likely been committed, the
Sixth Circuit held that “it was not clearly established that Mr. Peffer’s
actions as alleged in the affidavit did not violate” Michigan state law,
and therefore there was no constitutional violation.254 The court’s rea-
246. See id. at 264.
247. Id. at 264, 266.
248. United States v. Woosley, 361 F.3d 924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
249. Peffer, 880 F.3d at 264.
250. Id. at 266–73.
251. Id. at 264 (quoting Greene v. Reeves, 80 F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996)).
252. See United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2005)).
253. Peffer, 880 F.3d at 263 (quoting Greene, 80 F.3d at 1106).
254. Id. at 265.
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soning here was an obvious attempt to shift the burden away from
those who sought to enter a private residence. If the home is consid-
ered “sacred,”255 there should have been no burden on Mr. Peffer to
establish that his actions did not violate Michigan state law.256 Requir-
ing him to do so directly contradicts the presumption of innocence.
Not only did Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit fail to establish that a
crime had likely been committed, it failed to establish that Mr. Peffer
even owned a computer or any other type of technological equip-
ment.257 Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit provided no “particularized
facts demonstrating ‘a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be
located on the premises of the proposed search.’”258 Rather than fo-
cusing on whether the mailings were connected to technological
equipment that would likely be found inside the Peffer residence, the
Sixth Circuit’s reasoning focused too heavily on whether Mr. Peffer
was connected to the mailings themselves.259
In order to support a finding of probable cause, “the affidavit must
suggest ‘that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific
“things” to be searched for and seized are located on the property to
which entry is sought’ and not merely ‘that the owner of property is
suspected of crime.’”260 On this issue, the court completely skipped a
step in its analysis. It follows that the first step should have been to
determine whether there was any reason to believe that Mr. Peffer
owned the necessary technological equipment to commit the alleged
crime. Only after establishing that first criterion should the court have
moved into its analysis of whether such technological equipment
would likely be found in the Peffer residence.
In United States v. Griffith, the D.C. Circuit faced a similar issue and
performed the analysis correctly.261 In Griffith, the D.C. Circuit held
that an affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search a resi-
dence for a cellphone because “the affidavit . . . conveyed no reason to
think that [the defendant], in particular, owned a cell phone.”262 The
D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion because “[t]here was no observa-
tion of [the defendant] using a cell phone, no information about any-
one having received a cell phone call or text message from him, no
record of officers recovering any cell phone in his possession at the
255. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013).
256. Peffer, 880 F.3d at 265.
257. Id. at 269.
258. United States v. McPhearson, 469 F.3d 518, 524 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2005)).
259. See Peffer, 880 F.3d at 266.
260. McPhearson, 469 F.3d at 524 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547,
556 (1978)).
261. See United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
262. Id.
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time of his previous arrest . . . and no indication otherwise of his own-
ership of a cell phone at any time.”263
The D.C. Circuit in Griffith reached its conclusion even after ac-
knowledging the fact that “most people today own a cell phone.”264
This case is clearly extremely analogous to the facts in Peffer, and the
Sixth Circuit should have paid closer attention to the D.C. Circuit’s
rationale when conducting its analysis. But instead, the Sixth Circuit
completely skipped the first step. The Sixth Circuit moved straight
into its analysis of whether there is a presumption that computers are
kept in the residence without first establishing that Mr. Peffer even
owned a computer.265
To support the presumption that a nexus existed between com-
puters and the residence, the Sixth Circuit attempted to analogize with
cases involving the use of a firearm.266 The court asserted that guns
and computers “are both personal possessions often kept in their
owner’s residence and therefore subject to the presumption that a
nexus exists between an object used in a crime and the suspect’s cur-
rent residence.”267 The court admitted, however, that “[c]omputers
are dissimilar to guns in many ways . . . .”268 But guns and computers
are so dissimilar that it renders this analogy completely unworkable.
In a world of global networks and people using multiple electronic
devices in many different places to perform many tasks, it is nearly
impossible to generalize where computer-stored evidence is likely to
be found. Unlike firearms, people in the modern era are continuously
using technology even when they step out of their front door, whether
it is through the use of cell phone technology, automobile technology,
or public means of information.269 It would be absurd to generalize
that most people keep their means of technology in their residence
when modern use of technology is not even slightly limited to the inte-
rior of a building.270 In the modern era, most people in the United
States own some form of technology.271 The court’s reasoning in Pef-
fer allows the police to create some tenuous theory as to how a per-
son’s technology factored into some suspected crime, and therefore
use that theory to enter the person’s home.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. See Peffer, 880 F.3d at 270.
266. See id. at 271–72.
267. Id. at 272.
268. Id.
269. See Internet Stats & Facts for 2019, HOSTING FACTS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://
hostingfacts.com/internet-facts-stats/ [https://perma.cc/LHB6-6X7A].
270. See id.
271. See J. Clement, Internet Usage in the United States – Statistics & Facts,
STATISTA (Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.statista.com/topics/2237/internet-usage-in-the-
united-states/ [https://perma.cc/K7B7-6232].
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The court should have more closely followed its reasoning in cases
involving drug distribution.272 The Sixth Circuit had previously held
that “if the affidavit fails to include facts that directly connect the resi-
dence with the suspected drug dealing activity, or the evidence of this
connection is unreliable, it cannot be inferred that drugs will be found
in the defendant’s home . . . .”273 The affidavit in Peffer completely
failed to include facts that directly connected the residence with a
computer.274 Like in cases involving drug distribution, and unlike
cases involving firearms, it is difficult to generalize where the incrimi-
nating evidence will be found.
To make the court’s analysis even worse, the Sixth Circuit adopted
the presumption that a nexus exists between computers and the resi-
dence by citing to three cases involving child pornography that are
completely dissimilar to the facts of Peffer.275 The first case found that
an “affidavit established nexus because [it alleged that] the suspect’s
residence had high-speed internet and the suspect had been observed
using a laptop on his front porch.”276 The second case found that an
“affidavit established nexus because [it alleged that] the IP address
used to distribute prohibited material was accessed by a residential
modem located in the general vicinity of [the] suspect’s residence
. . . .”277 Finally, the third case found that an affidavit established
nexus because it established that the “suspect had a computer at his
residence and had sent an email containing prohibited material
. . . .”278
It is not difficult to see how these three cases have absolutely no
relation to the facts in Peffer. Sergeant Stephens’s affidavit provided
no evidence that the Peffer residence was equipped with high-speed
internet.279 There was no observation of Mr. Peffer ever using a com-
puter.280 There was no evidence that a residential modem existed next
to the Peffer residence.281 There was no evidence that Mr. Peffer had
a computer in his residence.282 There was not even any evidence that
Mr. Peffer owned a computer whatsoever.283 The Sixth Circuit’s rea-
soning here was simply based on a sloppy non-sequitur fallacy that
“because the affidavit reported that the letters and fliers appeared to
be computer-generated, . . . evidence of those documents was likely to
272. See Peffer, 880 F.3d at 272–73.
273. Id. at 273 (quoting United States v. Brown, 828 F.3d 375, 383–84 (6th Cir.
2016)).
274. See id. at 269.
275. See id. at 272.
276. Id. (citing United States v. Elbe, 774 F.3d 885, 890 (6th Cir. 2014)).
277. Id. (citing United States v. Lapsins, 570 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2009)).
278. Id. at 272 (citing United States v. Terry, 522 F.3d 645, 648 (6th Cir. 2008)).
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be found on an electronic storage device, which . . . would likely be
kept at its owner’s residence.”284 The cases that the Sixth Circuit cites
did an extremely poor job at remedying its formal fallacy.
Ultimately, Sergeant Stephens’s argument in support of probable
cause was nothing more than a combination of subjective, good faith
hunches that (1) Mr. Peffer owned a computer, and (2) evidence of
the alleged crime would be found at his residence. Sergeant Ste-
phens’s affidavit fell short of providing articulable facts to support
these hunches. The belief that the evidence sought will be found at the
location to be searched must be supported by “more than mere suspi-
cion.”285 Further, “simple ‘good faith on the part of the arresting of-
ficer is not enough.’”286 The outcome in Peffer is exactly what the
Supreme Court aimed to prevent.287 Mr. Peffer’s Fourth Amendment
protections evaporated, and he was only “‘secure in [his] person[] and
house[], papers and effects’” at the discretion of the police.288
B. Breadth of the Holding
The largest controversy surrounding the Peffer case is the court’s
willingness to implement a legal presumption that evidence of tech-
nology is likely to be found at the defendant’s residence.289 The search
warrant in Peffer authorized the police to search for and seize a very
broad category of computer-related evidence.290 When inferring a
nexus between evidence and a suspect’s residence, magistrates must
consider “the type of crime being investigated [and] the nature of
things to be seized . . . .”291 An honest consideration of the nature of
computer-generated evidence shows why the breadth of the Peffer
holding was much too broad.
With over 312 million internet users as of 2018, the United States is
one of the largest online markets worldwide.292 About 87.27% of the
United States population accessed the internet as of 2017.293 The num-
284. Id. at 269.
285. United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 686 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Bethal, 245 F. App’x 460, 464 (6th Cir. 2007)).
286. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (explaining that the Court refuses to sanc-
tion “intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more sub-
stantial than inarticulate hunches”) (citation omitted).
287. See id.
288. See id. (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
289. See Peffer, 880 F.3d at 270–71.
290. See id. at 261–62.
291. United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 1985)).
292. Clement, supra note 271.
293. J. Clement, United States Internet Penetration 2000-2017, STATISTA (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/209117/us-internet-penetration/ [https://per
ma.cc/7RCD-XBQW].
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ber of internet users is growing by the second.294 People access the
internet through smartphones, tablets, automobiles, and even com-
mercial airlines. Mobile internet traffic accounts for the majority of all
internet traffic.295 When considering the nature of modern technology,
it becomes clear why a presumption that technological evidence is
likely to be found inside the residence is misguided. Technology in the
modern era is in no way limited to the interior of the home. The court
in Peffer painted with too broad of a brush by implementing a legal
presumption that evidence of technology is likely to be found at a
defendant’s residence. It is nonsensical to establish a rebuttable nexus
between technology and the home when the majority of internet us-
age occurs outside the home.296
A major consideration when inferring a nexus between evidence
and a suspect’s residence is the likelihood that the evidence will be
found outside the home.297 The affidavit in Peffer provided no facts
that would lead to a conclusion that Mr. Peffer owned computer tech-
nology or that technological evidence would be found in his resi-
dence.298 If we consider the substantial presence of mobile technology
in the modern era, the more accurate presumption in the Peffer case
would have been that evidence of Mr. Peffer’s crimes would likely be
found somewhere other than in his home, unless the affidavit provided
articulable facts to suggest otherwise. The court’s presumption that a
nexus existed between computer evidence and the Peffer residence
failed to consider the reality of modern technology use.
The Sixth Circuit essentially relied on the outdated proposition that
it was reasonable to assume that criminal defendants keep their pos-
sessions where they reside, unless the presumption is rebutted.299
While this presumption may be accurate in other cases, it is com-
pletely inapplicable to cases involving the use of computer technology.
The onus should not be on the millions of technology users to prove
why evidence of technology is not likely to be found in their residence.
The data already suggests otherwise;300 the Sixth Circuit simply ig-
nored it. There should be no such presumption. The officer providing
the affidavit in support of probable cause should have the burden of
294. Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS., http://www.internetlivestats.com/in-
ternet-users/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2020) [https://perma.cc/CXF9-VPUB].
295. J. Clement, Share of Global Mobile Website Traffic 2015-2019, STATISTA (Dec.
3, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/277125/share-of-website-traffic-coming-
from-mobile-devices/ [https://perma.cc/PWX2-RLF4].
296. See id. (demonstrating that mobile internet traffic accounts for the majority of
all internet traffic).
297. See United States v. Williams, 544 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that magistrates must consider the extent of an opportunity to conceal the evidence
elsewhere and the normal inferences that may be drawn as to likely hiding places).
298. See Peffer, 880 F.3d at 269.
299. Id. at 270.
300. See Clement, supra note 295.
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producing articulable facts to suggest why computer-generated evi-
dence is linked to a criminal defendant’s residence.
Technological advancement is growing exponentially.301 In the 21st
century and beyond, technology inside a person’s home is likely to
contain digital evidence of a large portion of an individual’s life. The
holding in Peffer ultimately leads to a result where, as technology ad-
vances, it becomes easier for the State to justify entering the home.
Further, it is likely difficult to curtail a search for a specific amount of
technological data without also exposing much more of an individual’s
technological information. In other words, it is hard to limit the scope
of searches that are based on obtaining technological information
within the household. With all of these considerations in mind, it is
difficult to justify the breadth of the Peffer holding.
C. Public, Economic, and Technological Policy
The holding in Peffer creates negative incentives in direct disregard
of sound public, economic, and technological policy. Mobile use of
technology dominates the majority of technology use.302 If the home is
truly “sacred”303 under the Fourth Amendment, then the home should
be excluded from general presumptions about where technological ev-
idence is likely to be found. Additionally, the economic costs of con-
ducting a Fourth Amendment search are not generally “borne by the
police.”304 Rather, the public body that endures the searches and
seizures incurs the costs.305 As a result, the police have an incentive to
engage in more invasive searches unless Fourth Amendment law re-
quires the State to account for the economic costs.306 Law should in-
centivize technological growth and economically efficient searches
rather than punish it.
Under the Peffer standard, as technology advances, probable cause
of criminal misconduct inside a person’s residence becomes much eas-
ier for the government to obtain. Technological growth will soon lead
to a society where the vast majority of information regarding a per-
son’s life and activities will be stored electronically. In order to pro-
mote technological advancement and to prevent unreasonable
invasions of privacy, Fourth Amendment law should require more
than the simple use of electronic technology to justify a search of a
suspect’s residence.
301. Big Idea: Technology Grows Exponentially, BIG THINK (Mar. 21, 2011), https:/
/bigthink.com/think-tank/big-idea-technology-grows-exponentially [https://perma.cc/
Q53F-DU9T].
302. See Clement, supra note 295.
303. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984).
304. See Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 591, 598 (2016).
305. See id.
306. See id.
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With the exponential growth of technology,307 it becomes more
likely that an individual’s technological equipment will contain digital
evidence of alleged crimes. By using technology’s inevitable grasp
over modern life, as technology advances, the Peffer holding allows
the State to circumvent the constitutional requirement of a “particu-
lar[ ]” description of “the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”308 Further, if the simple use of technology is
enough to justify breaking down the front door, a negative economic
incentive is created against the use and advancement of technology. In
a globalizing world-economy, differences in technological advance-
ment between countries explain their differences in economic growth
and income inequality.309 Thus, in order for the United States to main-
tain its status as a leader in the online market,310 a stricter interpreta-
tion of the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement is
necessary.
V. CONCLUSION: HOW SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
SHOULD MOVE FORWARD
In October 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari of the Peffer case.311 But as technology continues its expo-
nential growth, courts in the United States will soon be faced with
many cases involving issues similar to those in Peffer v. Stephens. Pef-
fer is simply the first example in the inevitably large number of cases
that will hinge on the constitutionality of searching a criminal defen-
dant’s home based on the use of electronic technology. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court will likely need to grant review of another Fourth
Amendment case in order to clarify exactly what the Fourth Amend-
ment requires when searching a suspect’s home based on the use of
technology.
Until then, it would not be surprising to see circuit courts limit the
Peffer rationale to its facts. The likelihood that using a computer to
commit a crime means that evidence of the crime will be found within
the suspect’s residence seems too fact-dependent to justify such a
broad presumption. After all, the nature of the probable cause ques-
tion is inherently fact-dependent.
Should the Supreme Court grant review of a Fourth Amendment
case to solve the Peffer issue, the Court should heavily consider Judge
307. See Big Idea: Technology Grows Exponentially, BIG THINK (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://bigthink.com/think-tank/big-idea-technology-grows-exponentially [https://per
ma.cc/Q53F-DU9T].
308. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
309. Hulya Kesici Caliskan, Technological Change and Economic Growth, 195 SOC.
& BEHAV. SCI. 649, 649 (2015).
310. See Clement, supra note 271.
311. Peffer v. Stephens, 139 S. Ct. 108, 108 (2018).
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Sri Srinivasan’s rationale in United States v. Griffith.312 Although the
Griffith holding does not directly contradict the Peffer rationale, the
Griffith court showed much more skepticism about presuming that ev-
idence of electronic technology is inherently linked to a suspect’s resi-
dence.313 At the very least, the court in Griffith required the officer’s
affidavit to articulate a reason to believe that the suspect owned the
technology in question.314
Ultimately, the Supreme Court should do away with any broad pre-
sumptions about where evidence of criminal misconduct will be found,
especially in cases involving the use of technology. Second, the Su-
preme Court should clarify that the overriding burden of producing
facts in support of probable cause rests with the State, rather than
requiring anything from the criminal suspect. If the State’s burden is
not met, the front door should not open. Third, in cases involving the
use of technology, the Supreme Court should require affidavits to al-
lege articulable facts that lead to a conclusion that the criminal defen-
dant actually owns the technology in question. If the Supreme Court
implements such a rule, it would be a sound decision in favor of tech-
nological innovation, economic policy, and civil liberties.
312. See United States v. Griffith, 867 F.3d 1265, 1271–72 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
313. See id.
314. See id. at 1272.
